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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

: Case No. 930275-CA

v.

:

RONALD L. BOREN,

: Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on

the elements of theft?
"Determining the propriety of the instructions
submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we
therefore review the trial court's instructions under a
correction of error standard."
(Utah App. 1993).

Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471

Additionally, this Court "review[s] jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."
(Utah App. 1992).

State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205

2.

Where the trial court properly instructed the jury

on the intent for theft and the State's burden of proof, did
those instructions create a constitutionally impermissible
mandatory rebuttable presumption?
This issue is governed by the same standard of review
as Issue 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutory provisions are at issue in this
appeal (attached as Addendum A ) .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-404 (1990):
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3) (1990):
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 78).
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the
judge not instruct the jury on the statutory elements of theft

2

listed in Section 76-6-401 (3) (b) (R. 115-120).

The trial court

denied this motion (R. 383-85).
A jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 212).
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on the trial
court's denial of his motion in limine and the trial court's
refusal to give a requested instruction adding the word
"permanently" to the elements of theft (R. 225-26).

The trial

court denied the motion for a new trial (R. 361).
The trial court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402
(Supp. 1992), reduced defendant's conviction one degree and
sentenced defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison and to pay restitution in the amount of $150.00 (R. 265).
The court stayed the sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six
months probation (R. 265).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Jeb Clark, the victim in this case, purchased a car for
99 cents (Tr. Feb. 9, 1993, "Tr.l" at 58) (R. 377, 379) (Exhibit
1).
58).

The vehicle was operable after some initial repairs (Tr.l at
The ignition operated with a screwdriver or knife, and no

key was needed to start the car (Tr.l at 59, 63, 112) (Exhibit
3) .
Defendant's brother, assisted by defendant, repaired
the car's brakes (Tr.l at 68) (R. 366). Defendant's brother
frequently drove the car and had repaired the car in the past
(Tr.l at 79, 93, 95). Mr. Clark was unaware that defendant had
worked on the car and never discussed the brake job with
3

defendant (Tr.l at 69, 76, 92). However, Mr. Clark subsequently
learned that defendant expected to be paid for the work (Tr.l at
71) .
On April 18, 1992, Mr. Clark lent the car to Lyla Shore
(Tr.l at 64, 105). A witness saw defendant drive the car out of
Ms. Shore's driveway (Tr.l at 83-84).

Neither Mr. Clark nor Ms.

Shore gave defendant permission to drive the car (Tr.l at 65,
111) .
Defendant told his son and his brother that he would
return the car to Mr. Clark if he received compensation for his
work on the brakes (Tr.l at 87-89) (R. 366-67).
The next morning, Mr. Clark, Ms. Shore and Bryan Shore
drove to defendant's ex-wife's house and saw the car parked in
front of her house (Tr.l at 108, 114, 120). The license plates
on the car had been changed (Tr.l at 65, 125-126).
Defendant saw this group, ran from the house, threw the
ignition switch into the field behind his house and hid behind a
fence (Tr.l at 109, 110, 120). Mr. Clark heard defendant shout
that the "next time he got ahold of the car, it would be in the
Jordan River" (Tr.l at 74, 78). The police arrived and arrested
defendant for theft of the car (Tr.l at ill).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the
elements of theft.

Defendant's requested instruction misstated

the law by ignoring two of three alternate statutory definitions
of "purpose to deprive" in the theft statute.
4

The court

correctly instructed the jury on the requisite intent for theft.
The court's instructions properly followed the statutory
language, which does not create an impermissible
presumption."

This Court

"mandatory

defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE ELEMENTS OF THEFT
Defendant

nidJitis U K

I J hi I t

il erroneously fai] ed to

include the word "permanently" when it instructed the jury on the
elements of theft.

Br. of App. at 5-12.

instruction would

However, such an

isstatement c: f t .he .1 a i

"'

court

properly instructed the jury on the law of theft.
i

Standard of Review for Jury Instructions

"Determining Ihh propriety

nstractions

submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we
therefore review the trial court's instructions under a
correction of error standard."
(Utah App. 1993).

Ames v. Maas,

8, 471

Additionally, this Court "review[s] jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."
(Utah App. 1992).

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205

Furthermore, "the trial court is not required

to give any requested jury instruction
accurately state the applicable l a w *
781,

y^'i (Utah I 991) .

5

does not

. . .

State v. James, 819 P.2d

B.

Jury Instructions in this Case

Jury Instruction 9 tracked Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-404
(1990) verbatim.

The instruction read, "Under the law of the

State of Utah, a person is guilty of theft if that person obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof."

(R. 193)

(Instructions 8, 9, 10 are Attached as Addendum B ) .
4-404 states:

Section 76-

"A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises

unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof." (Addendum A ) .
Furthermore, the trial court correctly instructed the
jury on the alternate statutory definitions of "purpose to
deprive" set forth in Section 76-6-401(3):
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and benefit
thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other
compensation; t1] or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.

defendant's object seems to have been to deprive the jury
of the option of relying on this subsection, which defendant was
forced to admit covered the facts of this case. Defendant's
opening statement included this statement: "Now, the evidence is
going to show that Mr. Boren, when Mr. Clark failed to pay him,
Mr. Boren took the car and said, 'You can have it back, just give
me my $25 for the work I've done on your car.'" (Tr. Feb. 9,
1993 at 52) .

6

(emphasis added) (Addendum A ) .

Jury Instruction 10 sets forth

this language verbatim (R. 194) (Addendum B ) .
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Asay. 631
P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1981) "[t]he wording of the given
instructions recite ::i tl: ME st ati it : 1: j elements of the offense of
theft nearly verbatim.

Hence, no error is contained therein."

C. Defendant's Proposed Instructions
Misstated the Law
Defendant complains that the term "permanently" in
Instruction 10 "modifies only one

the three alternative

definitions" and that "the jury was allowed to consider either
one of the two other alternatives, both of which were not
modified by the adverb, 'permanently. '"

4-10.

However, the legislature chose to include three alternative
definitions of the intent necessary for a "purpose to deprive."
Defendant's requested addition of the word "permanently"
restricts the crime of theft to only one of three statutory
definitions and is therefore, a misstatement of the law.

As the

supreme court held in James, "the trial court is not required to
give any requested jury instruction if it does not . . .
accurately state the applicable law

819 P.2d at 799.

D. The Jury Considered Defendants Theory of
the Case
Additionally, the trial court adequately instructed the
jury on defendant's theory of the case.
402(4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-

) (court obligated to give lesser included

instruction if "there is a rational basis for a v erdict
7

acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting of
the included offense").

Defendant asserted that he merely

temporarily deprived the victim of the car and that he did not
have the required intent for theft (R. 115-129, 384-85).
However, the jury considered and rejected defendant's theory by
following the jury instructions and convicting defendant of theft
(R. 197-199, 212-215).

The trial court properly instructed the

jury on defendant's theory of the case by giving instructions on
the lesser included offenses of the temporary deprivation of a
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-la-1311 (1) and joyriding
in violation of Section 41-la-1314(1) (R. 197-199).

The jury

rejected these lesser included charges and found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed theft.2
POINT II
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT RELIEVE THE STATE OF
ITS BURDEN TO PROVE INTENT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT
Defendant asserts that Instruction 10
unconstitutionally relieved the State of its burden to prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt by
creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption.
15.

Br. of App. at 12-

A jury instruction creates an unconstitutional mandatory

defendant's reliance on State v. Chesnut. 621 P.2d 1228,
1232 (Utah 1980), disapproved on other grounds State v. Crick,
675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983), in support of his claim of error
is misplaced. Br. of App. at 5-12. The supreme court overturned
Chesnut's conviction because the trial court failed to instruct
the jury on lesser included offenses. Id. at 1232. Here, the
trial court properly instructed the jury on all requested lesser
included offenses.
8

presumption where the language instructs the jury that it can
"infer" an element cf the crime or that certain evidence creates
a "prima facie" presumption of guilt.

See Sandstrom v. Montana,

442 U.S. 510, 515 (1979) (jury impermissibly instructed that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts.") (emphasis added); Francis
v. Franklin, 4/x u.o. ou/, 316 (1985) (improper instruction that
"acts of a person nf smmd mind and discretion are presumed to be
the product of the person's will," and that a person "is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.").
However, none of the instructions in this case contained this
impermissible language (R. 188-211).3
Contrary

defendant

assertion

* he instructions do

not provide that the State need only prove certain predicate

defendant's reliance on two Utah cases in support of this
position is likewise misplaced. He cites State v. Chambers, 709
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) and State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah
1987) for the proposition that a jury instruction that tracks
statutory language verbatim creates this type of impermissible
presumption. Br. of App. at 14-15. However, in both cases, the
language of the statute, and the instruction, contained the
impermissible language. Compare Chambers, 709 P.2d at 324
("[p]ossession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property.") (emphasis added), and Johnson. 745 P.2d at 456
("possession of property recently stolen, when a person in
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such
possession, is a fact from which you may infer that the person in
possession stole such property.11) (emphasis added), with, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), "[p]ossession of property
recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the
person in possession stole the property." This type of
impermissible language is not found in the trial court's jury
instructions (R. 188-211).
9

facts in order for the jury to presume intent.

Rather, they

clearly instructed the jury that the State bore the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the
conscious object to deprive another of his property.
Instruction 8 stated:
You are instructed that in every crime or
public offense, there must be a union or
joint operation of the act and intent. A
person is only guilty of an offense when his
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with
some kind of criminal intent that is, he acts
intentionally or knowingly as the definition
of an offense requires. As used in these
instructions, a person engages in conduct
"intentionally" or with intent, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage
in conduct or cause the result. As used in
these instructions, a persons engages in
conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.
(R. 192) (emphasis added).

This instruction along with

Instructions 9 and 10 forced the jury to focus on the definition
of intent.

When read in conjunction with Instructions 3, 5, and

7 (attached as Addendum C), which emphasize the proper standard
of proof, the jury understood that the State had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant had to have a "conscious
objective" to meet the element of "purpose to deprive" in the
crime of theft (R. 192, 194) (Addendum B) see Point I, Part B
supra.

The trial court never instructed the jury that it could

infer or presume the requisite intent, or any other element of
the crime, from any particular evidence.
The instructions as a whole informed the jury of the
intent required for theft.

Defendant fails to demonstrate how
10

these instructions created an impermissible mandatory
presumption.

The jury properly based its guilty verdict on the

evidence in accordance with these instructions.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the
elements of the crime of theft and the requisite intent.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm defendant's theft
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this if

day of November, 1993

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by first class mail
to RONALD S. FUJINO and ROGER SCOWCROFT, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOC, attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this ]£
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day of November, 1993.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History. C. 1963, 7*6-404, enacted by L.
1*73, eh, 196, I 76-6-404.

Croes-Refereneet. — Motor vehicle*, specUI anti-theft lswi, II 41-1-105 to 14-1-121.
Shoplifting Act, I 78-11-14 et seq.

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodying
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
aecure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and
that is likley to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents anotherfromacquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the extfoyment of the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter
of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not
intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. 1963, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1S7S, eh. 166, I 76-6-401.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are instructed that in every crime or public offense,
there must be a union or joint operation of the act and intent,
A person is only guilty of an offense when his conduct is
prohibited by law and he acts with some kind of criminal intent that
is, he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition of an
offense requires.
As used in these instructions, a person engages in conduct
* intentionally" or with intent, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result.
As used in these instructions, a person engages in conduct
"knowingly" or with knowledge, when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.

0019?

INSTRUCTION NO.

C\

Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of
theft if that person obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof.

001

INSTRUCTION NO.

•Property"

means

anything

of

tt>

value,

including

tangible

personal property.
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a
transfer of possession or of some other legally

recognized

interest in property, whether to the obtained or another.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objective
/to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be
lost,^gf to restore the property only upon payment of a reward
or other compensation, >^r to dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover
it.
An "operable motor vehicle" is a motor vehicle capable of
being driven.
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or
is near the day alleged in the Information.

00194

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.
Instruction No

2

1 is not to be considered by you as a

statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you merely as a summarizeo
of the Information.
charged with

itement <»II i:h H u I legalI oris

The mere fact that the defendant stands

offense is not fo he taken by you as any evi-

dence of his guilt.

• '• • • '

:

' INSTRUCTli

You are instructed that
has entered a plea of not guilty.

^
nformation

defendant

The plea of not guilty denies

each and all ] :::: f tl: .- E essei it a all al legati ons of tl: ME • charge contained
in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving
each and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and beyond

easonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

You diii mi mi in"" i inn in i I ill I 111 in i the mere fact that ih*> defendant
has been charged with this offense and has been held to answer to
the charge by a committing magistrate,

not any evidence of his

guilt ana
by you in determining his guilt or innocence.

00188

INSTRUCTION NO.

6

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to
follow the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this
court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty".

This duty you

should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion
or prejudice against him.

You must not suffer yourselves to be

biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to
stand trial.

None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you

are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in
this trial and the law as stated to you by me.

The law forbids

you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.

Both the State of

Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict may be.

The verdict must express the individual opinion

of each juror.

ooisn

' INSTRUCTION NO

C

1

All presumptions o* ^ w , independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of &

reasonable-doubt as to whether his g til, li: m s a t J B facecni' i,
1

shown,

entitled to an acquittal•
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State

to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a whoJly
possibility.

Pro-

spec

>eyond a reasonable doubt is that degree

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding
those who are bound to act conscientious!)- upon II i i J, u* . . .
all reasonable

doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of the evidence In tins

ase
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